Class: Scryer::Rules::CommandInjectionRule
- Inherits:
-
Scryer::Rule
- Object
- Scryer::Rule
- Scryer::Rules::CommandInjectionRule
- Defined in:
- lib/scryer/rules/command_injection_rule.rb
Overview
Flags shell-executing calls (system, ` ` backticks, %x{},
Kernel#exec, IO.popen, Open3.*) whose command string contains
interpolation — user-controlled input reaching a shell is a command
injection risk.
Constant Summary collapse
- SHELL_METHODS =
%w[system exec popen spawn].freeze
Instance Attribute Summary
Attributes inherited from Scryer::Rule
Instance Method Summary collapse
Methods inherited from Scryer::Rule
Constructor Details
This class inherits a constructor from Scryer::Rule
Instance Method Details
#scan ⇒ Object
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# File 'lib/scryer/rules/command_injection_rule.rb', line 15 def scan findings = [] Ast.each_node(sexp) do |node| # backticks / %x{} literals: [:xstring_literal, [:xstring, [:@tstring_content, ...] or [:string_embexpr, ...]]] if Ast.tagged?(node, :xstring_literal) && Ast.string_literal_has_interpolation?(node) line = Ast.line_of(node) findings << finding( line: line, message: "Backtick/`%x{}` shell execution contains interpolated input.", suggested_fix: "Avoid shelling out with interpolated strings. If you must run a " \ "command, use `system(\"cmd\", arg1, arg2)` (array form) so each " \ "argument is passed directly to the OS without going through a shell." ) end next unless Ast.tagged?(node, :method_add_arg, :command, :command_call) inner = Ast.tagged?(node, :method_add_arg) ? node[1] : node receiver_and_name = Ast.call_name(inner) next unless receiver_and_name _receiver, method_name = receiver_and_name next unless SHELL_METHODS.include?(method_name) args = Ast.call_arguments(node) next if args.empty? first_arg = args.first next unless Ast.string_literal_has_interpolation?(first_arg) line = Ast.line_of(first_arg) || Ast.line_of(node) findings << finding( line: line, message: "`#{method_name}` is called with a single interpolated string, which goes " \ "through a shell — user-controlled input here can inject arbitrary commands.", suggested_fix: "Pass arguments as separate strings instead of one interpolated " \ "string, e.g. `#{method_name}(\"cmd\", user_input)` rather than " \ "`#{method_name}(\"cmd \#{user_input}\")` — the array form bypasses the shell entirely." ) end findings end |