Module: Altcha::V2
- Defined in:
- lib/altcha/v2.rb
Overview
V2 proof-of-work: find a counter C such that KDF(nonce+C) starts with keyPrefix. Supports SHA-, PBKDF2/SHA-, and SCRYPT algorithms via OpenSSL::KDF.
Defined Under Namespace
Classes: Challenge, ChallengeParameters, CreateChallengeOptions, Payload, ServerSignaturePayload, Solution, VerifyServerSignatureResult, VerifySolutionResult
Constant Summary collapse
- DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH =
32- DEFAULT_KEY_PREFIX =
'00'
Class Method Summary collapse
-
.canonical_json(obj) ⇒ Object
Produces a canonical (sorted-key, compact) JSON string.
-
.constant_time_equal?(a, b) ⇒ Boolean
Constant-time string comparison.
-
.create_challenge(options) ⇒ Challenge
Creates a v2 proof-of-work challenge.
-
.derive_key(parameters, salt_bytes, password_bytes) ⇒ Object
Derives a key from the given parameters, salt, and password bytes.
-
.hmac_hex(data, key, algorithm = 'SHA-256') ⇒ Object
Computes an HMAC hex digest using the specified algorithm ('SHA-256' etc.).
-
.make_password(nonce_bytes, counter) ⇒ Object
Builds the password buffer (nonce bytes + counter) used for key derivation.
-
.parse_verification_data(data, array_fields: %w[fields reasons])) ⇒ Object
Parses a URL-encoded verification_data string into a typed Hash.
-
.solve_challenge(challenge, max_counter: nil, counter_start: 0, counter_step: 1) ⇒ Solution?
Solves a v2 challenge by brute-forcing counter values.
-
.verify_fields_hash(form_data:, fields:, fields_hash:, algorithm: 'SHA-256') ⇒ Boolean
Verifies the SHA hash of selected form fields.
-
.verify_server_signature(payload:, hmac_secret:) ⇒ VerifyServerSignatureResult
Verifies a server signature payload from the ALTCHA backend.
-
.verify_solution(challenge, solution, hmac_signature_secret:, hmac_key_signature_secret: nil, hmac_algorithm: 'SHA-256') ⇒ VerifySolutionResult
Verifies a v2 solution against its challenge.
Class Method Details
.canonical_json(obj) ⇒ Object
Produces a canonical (sorted-key, compact) JSON string.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 254 def self.canonical_json(obj) case obj when Hash pairs = obj.sort_by { |k, _| k.to_s } .map { |k, v| "#{k.to_s.to_json}:#{canonical_json(v)}" } "{#{pairs.join(',')}}" when Array "[#{obj.map { |v| canonical_json(v) }.join(',')}]" else obj.to_json end end |
.constant_time_equal?(a, b) ⇒ Boolean
Constant-time string comparison.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 345 def self.constant_time_equal?(a, b) return false if a.bytesize != b.bytesize OpenSSL.fixed_length_secure_compare(a, b) rescue ArgumentError false end |
.create_challenge(options) ⇒ Challenge
Creates a v2 proof-of-work challenge.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 356 def self.create_challenge() key_length = .key_length || DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH key_prefix = .key_prefix || DEFAULT_KEY_PREFIX key_prefix_length = .key_prefix_length || (key_length / 2) expires_at = .expires_at.is_a?(Time) ? .expires_at.to_i : .expires_at parameters = ChallengeParameters.new( algorithm: .algorithm, nonce: OpenSSL::Random.random_bytes(16).unpack1('H*'), salt: OpenSSL::Random.random_bytes(16).unpack1('H*'), cost: .cost, key_length: key_length, key_prefix: key_prefix, memory_cost: .memory_cost, parallelism: .parallelism, expires_at: expires_at, data: .data ) derived_key_bytes = nil if .counter nonce_bytes = [parameters.nonce].pack('H*') salt_bytes = [parameters.salt].pack('H*') password_bytes = make_password(nonce_bytes, .counter) derived_key_bytes = derive_key(parameters, salt_bytes, password_bytes) parameters.key_prefix = derived_key_bytes[0, key_prefix_length].unpack1('H*') end if .hmac_signature_secret if derived_key_bytes && .hmac_key_signature_secret parameters.key_signature = hmac_hex( derived_key_bytes, .hmac_key_signature_secret ) end signature = hmac_hex( canonical_json(parameters.to_h), .hmac_signature_secret ) Challenge.new(parameters: parameters, signature: signature) else Challenge.new(parameters: parameters) end end |
.derive_key(parameters, salt_bytes, password_bytes) ⇒ Object
Derives a key from the given parameters, salt, and password bytes.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 274 def self.derive_key(parameters, salt_bytes, password_bytes) alg = parameters.algorithm key_len = parameters.key_length || DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH case alg when 'ARGON2ID' begin require 'argon2/kdf' rescue LoadError raise LoadError, "Add 'argon2-kdf' to your Gemfile to use the ARGON2ID algorithm" end # argon2-kdf's `m` is log2(memory_cost_in_KiB) — convert from KiB. m_kib = parameters.memory_cost || 65536 Argon2::KDF.argon2id( password_bytes, salt: salt_bytes, t: parameters.cost, m: Math.log2(m_kib).round, p: parameters.parallelism || 1, length: key_len ) when /\APBKDF2\// digest = case alg when 'PBKDF2/SHA-512' then 'SHA512' when 'PBKDF2/SHA-384' then 'SHA384' else 'SHA256' end OpenSSL::KDF.pbkdf2_hmac( password_bytes, salt: salt_bytes, iterations: parameters.cost, length: key_len, hash: digest ) when 'SCRYPT' OpenSSL::KDF.scrypt( password_bytes, salt: salt_bytes, N: parameters.cost, r: parameters.memory_cost || 8, p: parameters.parallelism || 1, length: key_len ) else # SHA-256 / SHA-384 / SHA-512 (iterative) digest = case alg when 'SHA-512' then 'SHA512' when 'SHA-384' then 'SHA384' else 'SHA256' end iterations = [parameters.cost, 1].max buf = salt_bytes.b + password_bytes.b derived = nil iterations.times do |i| derived = OpenSSL::Digest.digest(digest, i.zero? ? buf : derived) end derived[0, key_len] end end |
.hmac_hex(data, key, algorithm = 'SHA-256') ⇒ Object
Computes an HMAC hex digest using the specified algorithm ('SHA-256' etc.).
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 335 def self.hmac_hex(data, key, algorithm = 'SHA-256') digest = case algorithm when 'SHA-384' then 'SHA384' when 'SHA-512' then 'SHA512' else 'SHA256' end OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(digest, key, data) end |
.make_password(nonce_bytes, counter) ⇒ Object
Builds the password buffer (nonce bytes + counter) used for key derivation. Counter is encoded as a 4-byte big-endian unsigned integer.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 269 def self.make_password(nonce_bytes, counter) nonce_bytes + [counter].pack('N') end |
.parse_verification_data(data, array_fields: %w[fields reasons])) ⇒ Object
Parses a URL-encoded verification_data string into a typed Hash.
Booleans, integers, and floats are auto-detected; comma-separated fields
listed in array_fields are converted to arrays.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 507 def self.parse_verification_data(data, array_fields: %w[fields reasons]) result = {} URI.decode_www_form(data).each do |key, value| result[key] = if value == 'true' true elsif value == 'false' false elsif /\A\d+\z/.match?(value) value.to_i elsif /\A\d+\.\d+\z/.match?(value) value.to_f elsif array_fields.include?(key) && !value.empty? value.strip.split(',') else value.strip end end result rescue StandardError nil end |
.solve_challenge(challenge, max_counter: nil, counter_start: 0, counter_step: 1) ⇒ Solution?
Solves a v2 challenge by brute-forcing counter values.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 408 def self.solve_challenge(challenge, max_counter: nil, counter_start: 0, counter_step: 1) parameters = challenge.parameters nonce_bytes = [parameters.nonce].pack('H*') salt_bytes = [parameters.salt].pack('H*') key_prefix = parameters.key_prefix start_time = Time.now counter = counter_start loop do return nil if max_counter && counter > max_counter password_bytes = make_password(nonce_bytes, counter) derived_key_bytes = derive_key(parameters, salt_bytes, password_bytes) derived_key_hex = derived_key_bytes.unpack1('H*') if derived_key_hex.start_with?(key_prefix) return Solution.new( counter: counter, derived_key: derived_key_hex, time: ((Time.now - start_time) * 1000).round ) end counter += counter_step end end |
.verify_fields_hash(form_data:, fields:, fields_hash:, algorithm: 'SHA-256') ⇒ Boolean
Verifies the SHA hash of selected form fields.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 535 def self.verify_fields_hash(form_data:, fields:, fields_hash:, algorithm: 'SHA-256') digest = case algorithm when 'SHA-512' then 'SHA512' when 'SHA-384' then 'SHA384' else 'SHA256' end lines = fields.map { |f| form_data[f].to_s } OpenSSL::Digest.hexdigest(digest, lines.join("\n")) == fields_hash end |
.verify_server_signature(payload:, hmac_secret:) ⇒ VerifyServerSignatureResult
Verifies a server signature payload from the ALTCHA backend.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 549 def self.verify_server_signature(payload:, hmac_secret:) start_time = Time.now digest = case payload.algorithm when 'SHA-512' then 'SHA512' when 'SHA-384' then 'SHA384' else 'SHA256' end hash_bytes = OpenSSL::Digest.digest(digest, payload.verification_data) expected_sig = hmac_hex(hash_bytes, hmac_secret, payload.algorithm) verification_data = parse_verification_data(payload.verification_data) expired = !!(verification_data && verification_data['expire'] && verification_data['expire'] < Time.now.to_i) invalid_signature = !constant_time_equal?(payload.signature.to_s, expected_sig) invalid_solution = verification_data.nil? || verification_data['verified'] != true || payload.verified != true verified = !expired && !invalid_signature && !invalid_solution VerifyServerSignatureResult.new( expired: expired, invalid_signature: invalid_signature, invalid_solution: invalid_solution, time: elapsed_ms(start_time), verification_data: verification_data, verified: verified ) end |
.verify_solution(challenge, solution, hmac_signature_secret:, hmac_key_signature_secret: nil, hmac_algorithm: 'SHA-256') ⇒ VerifySolutionResult
Verifies a v2 solution against its challenge.
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# File 'lib/altcha/v2.rb', line 442 def self.verify_solution(challenge, solution, hmac_signature_secret:, hmac_key_signature_secret: nil, hmac_algorithm: 'SHA-256') start_time = Time.now # 1. Expiration check. if challenge.parameters.expires_at && Time.now.to_i > challenge.parameters.expires_at return VerifySolutionResult.new( expired: true, invalid_signature: nil, invalid_solution: nil, time: elapsed_ms(start_time), verified: false ) end # 2. Signature presence check. unless challenge.signature return VerifySolutionResult.new( expired: false, invalid_signature: true, invalid_solution: nil, time: elapsed_ms(start_time), verified: false ) end # 3. Verify challenge signature (tamper detection). expected_sig = hmac_hex( canonical_json(challenge.parameters.to_h), hmac_signature_secret, hmac_algorithm ) unless constant_time_equal?(challenge.signature, expected_sig) return VerifySolutionResult.new( expired: false, invalid_signature: true, invalid_solution: nil, time: elapsed_ms(start_time), verified: false ) end # 4a. Fast path: verify via key signature when available. if challenge.parameters.key_signature && hmac_key_signature_secret derived_key_bytes = [solution.derived_key].pack('H*') expected_key_sig = hmac_hex(derived_key_bytes, hmac_key_signature_secret, hmac_algorithm) valid = constant_time_equal?(challenge.parameters.key_signature, expected_key_sig) return VerifySolutionResult.new( expired: false, invalid_signature: false, invalid_solution: !valid, time: elapsed_ms(start_time), verified: valid ) end # 4b. Slow path: re-derive key from the submitted counter and compare, # and require it to satisfy the signed key prefix. nonce_bytes = [challenge.parameters.nonce].pack('H*') salt_bytes = [challenge.parameters.salt].pack('H*') password_bytes = make_password(nonce_bytes, solution.counter) derived_key_bytes = derive_key(challenge.parameters, salt_bytes, password_bytes) derived_key_hex = derived_key_bytes.unpack1('H*') key_matches = constant_time_equal?(derived_key_hex, solution.derived_key) prefix_matches = derived_key_hex.start_with?(challenge.parameters.key_prefix) invalid = !(key_matches && prefix_matches) VerifySolutionResult.new( expired: false, invalid_signature: false, invalid_solution: invalid, time: elapsed_ms(start_time), verified: !invalid ) end |